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Introduction
Chiasmus, from chiazein, to mark with a chi [X]: an
inverted relationship between the syntactic elements
of parallel phrases (as in . . . to stop too fearful, and too
faint to go). — Merriam-Webster
The bind and the knot are necessary in order to take
a step. — Derrida
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Paralyses
At the beginning of his collected essays in political anthropology,
Pierre Clastres recounts a journey into the territory of the Yanomami
Indians. The author opens his text with a portrait of himself exhausted, crawling in the mud, a “Molloy in the Amazon,” as he puts
it.1 On the trail of what he calls “the last free primitive society,” the
grail of the ambitious ethnographer, Clastres is reduced to a clownish
figure he identifies with a character from Samuel Beckett.
This scene may serve as an emblem of my concerns in what follows. Clastres’s “Molloy in the Amazon” shares with all the texts
I examine here a critique of the figure of the modern traveler and
doubts as to the viability of travel itself. The anthropologist’s wry
self-portrait, I would argue, is more than a passing scruple or a
literary flourish; it indicates, rather, a crisis in the representation of
the traveler, whose authority is in question and whose story may
confound narrative. Clastres’s critique of the traveler threatens to
undermine the journey and its claims to knowledge and mastery,
thereby setting the tone for his text. Even as he bears witness to
the threatened life-world of the Yanomami, Clastres also testifies to
his own inability to prevent the disappearance of their distinctive
culture, or worse, as Western interloper, his unwitting implication
in the changes he describes. Anthropology as a result gives way to
what Lévi-Strauss in Tristes Tropiques called entropology, “the name
of the discipline concerned with the study of the highest manifestations of this process of disintegration.”2 Traveler and travelogue are
thus marked with the signs of futility and exhaustion.
Clastres’s travelogue is characteristic of a strain of postcolonial
anthropology for which travel, both as means of approach to its ob-
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jects and as organizing principle of narrative, is marred by a history
of political control, commercial exploitation, and ideological abuse.3
The development of mass tourism and the more recent encroachments of “ecotourism” exacerbate these problems by putting the
ethnographer at odds with travel circuits that are seen to contaminate
local cultures. For Clastres and his contemporaries, travel cannot
serve simply to authorize experience and justify knowledge, but
confronts them with the political and technological limitations that
underlie that experience and knowledge. Contemporary ethnographic
travel no longer considers itself apart from the vectors of imperial
power that made it possible as a field of study, and this contradiction
between travel’s conditions of possibility and its avowed aims has
yielded far-reaching insights in recent years into the epistemology
and political genealogy of anthropology.4 The moral plaints of “entropology” have thus led to a reflexive questioning of the discipline
of anthropology itself as unwitting agent of colonial and imperial
forms of controlling knowledge. Clastres made a vital contribution
to these debates by arguing that Europe confronted an “epistemological impossibility” in the New World, and that the legacy of that
original failed encounter is still maintained in anthropology today by
ingrained Western political notions of state, as well as our implication
in its insatiable and “ethnocidal” outgrowths, empire and capital.5
If empire haunts anthropology as a discipline, there are, however,
more insidious forms of power whose contradictions, and indeed
“impossibility,” may not lend themselves so readily to political and
epistemological analysis. My aim in what follows is to examine such
contradictions and their paralyzing logic. An intractable contradiction of anthropology, one that implicates travel as its method of
knowledge, pits the intention to study alien cultures against the
intrusion required to conduct such study. This is, so to speak, the
enabling contradiction of ethnography, one that is aggravated by
the discipline’s traditional investment in “primitive” and purportedly pure cultures. As a result, Clastres’s lyrical and elegiac line “a
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mortal shadow is being cast on all sides” is awkwardly complicit, as
a consequence, with the prosaic disaster he foretells for the Amazon:
“oil derricks around the chabunos, diamond mines in the hillsides,
police on the paths, boutiques on the riverbanks” (Archeology of
Violence, 27). This attitude, including both its mournful rapture
and its bitter complaint, resembles nothing so much as the refrain
of the tourist, who fruitlessly negates the very means that render
his mediated experience possible. In drawing such a comparison,
my intent is not to conflate the righteous militancy of a Clastres
combating ethnocide with the tourist’s mercenary demand for more
local color. And yet the tourist haunts Clastres’s own travelogue,
and his ironic deflation of his role as explorer is the symptom of a
paralyzing contradiction he shares with the ordinary traveler.
Lévi-Strauss speaks of this contradiction of ethnographic travel in
Tristes Tropiques. “I wished I had lived in the days of real journeys,”
he reflects, while recognizing that his own travels are the source
of more advanced anthropological knowledge, due to their very
belatedness (43). The anthropologist is, as a result, “paralyzed by
this dilemma,” and feels travel’s contradictions as the negation of all
mobile options. “I have only two possibilities: either I can be like
some traveller of the olden days, who was faced with a stupendous
spectacle, all, or almost all, of which eluded him, . . . or I can be a
modern traveller, chasing after the vestiges of a vanished reality.” As
a good dialectician, however, Lévi-Strauss converts his contradiction into a synthetic vision, and paralysis instead contributes to an
immobilized structural order in which “evanescent forms” and the
passage of time “crystallize into a sort of edifice” (44). The conversion of the traveler’s paralysis into the stability of structure is enabled
by a backward look at his journeys that distances his fieldwork in
time. But rather than resolve the dilemma that first paralyzed him,
Lévi-Strauss’s distancing strategy may only displace that dilemma.
In Time and the Other, Johannes Fabian argues that such distancing
strategies are inherent to the methodology of anthropology, whose
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“politics of time” denies a shared temporality with the cultures and
peoples it studies. Lévi-Strauss’s case is exemplary for Fabian, since
his “denial of coevalness” takes the radical form of a rejection of history and temporality as such in favor of structuralism’s synchronic
taxonomies. This appeal to structure, Fabian shows, goes hand in
hand with a negation of fieldwork, the spatiotemporal experience
of travel and exchange that nonetheless grounds anthropological
understanding. The mournful tone of Tristes Tropiques takes on the
character of a more violent sacrifice in the light of Fabian’s critique:
“Living in the Time of the primitives, the ethnographer will be an
ethnographer only if he outlives them, i.e., if he moves through the
Time he may have shared with them onto a level on which he finds
anthropology.”6 For Lévi-Strauss a synthesizing backward look resolves the traveler’s contradictions, and his paralyzing impasse is
overcome. But, Fabian asserts, structuralist anthropologists “do not
escape the aporia arising from the conflicting demands of coeval
research and allochronic discourse” (60). For Fabian this inescapable impasse is constitutive of Lévi-Strauss’s work and, indeed, all
anthropology.
This impasse is famously expressed in the first lines of Tristes
Tropiques: “I hate travelling and explorers,” Lévi-Strauss says, only
to add, “Yet here I am proposing to tell the story of my expeditions” (17). Lévi-Strauss’s defiant rejection of travel is more than an
authorial anxiety of influence or literary avant-gardism; it breaks
radically with travel and the travelogue, providing instead a vision
of universal structuring codes of human society. Tristes Tropiques,
a monument of modern travel writing, would aim at nothing less
than a rejection of travel as such. This attitude, however, has a long
genealogy. The critique of travel is endemic to French modernity and
is linked to cultural transformations that in fundamental ways alter
travel as form of experience and mode of representation. Among
these transformations are doubts as to the notion of progress and
its attendant metaphors; a critique of colonialism, along with the
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figures of discovery, adventure, and conquest that sustain its ideology; the rise of popular tourism, mass transit, and globalization;
and technological changes that defy inherited representations of
travel and transportation, prompting anxieties about spatiotemporal
displacements within the lived present of the modern metropole
itself. In 1859 Baudelaire vilified the very idea of progress in speaking
of “a victory every minute lost, a progress forever denying itself,”
a critique that would be echoed by the entire symbolist generation
and beyond.7 These doubts are scathingly represented as well in
Sentimental Education, where Flaubert describes a painting showing
“the Republic, or Progress, or Civilization, in the form of Christ
driving a locomotive through a virgin forest.”8 Conrad, inheritor
of Flaubert’s ironic vision, would later insist on the stillness of the
journey related in Heart of Darkness as his steamship and its “pilgrims” doggedly “crawled on.” 9 Clastres’s invocation of Molloy is
only a newer version of this ironic vision. In a more playful mode,
Jean Echenoz’s recent novel Courir delights in the absurd style of
Zátopek, the fastest runner of his time: “Emil seems to dig deep, or
dig in, like a man in a trance or a workman shoveling the roadway.
Far from all academic canons or any concern for elegance, Emil’s
progress is heavy, jerky, tortured, all fits and starts.”10 The “impossible style” of the runner is like Echenoz’s own, which seems to
take up the baton from Beckett and his memorable descriptions of
Molloy’s stumblings and Watt’s ridiculous gait.
Such paralyses may be found in all modern literature, but are
particularly insistent motifs in French writing. Even the exceptions
to this tendency confirm the rule; Le Clézio, perhaps the happiest
traveler in today’s more distinguished canon of writers, has been
called “the most English of French writers.”11 A recent resurgence
of travel literature in France, spearheaded by the manifesto Pour une
littérature voyageuse, as well as the annual literary festival Etonnants
Voyageurs, defines itself explicitly as a challenge to French literary tradition in advocating for “le ‘travel writing’ à la française.”12
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As Charles Forsdick points out, however, this movement is not
without a touch of nostalgia and indeed “neo-exoticism.”13 It may
even be seen to reprise an effort in the early twentieth century to
reinvigorate French colonialist writing through the example of the
adventurous Conrad. The opening salvo in Tristes Tropiques against
travel reflects this cultural context, and like other ambivalent statements of its genre, fails to settle accounts with journeys to which
it remains indebted. In what follows, then, I will sketch the salient
features of a modern French resistance to travel in literature. In
so doing, I will draw a distinction between the traveler’s habitual
frustrations, disavowals, and negations on the one hand, and their
more paralyzing contradictions on the other. The negation of travel
is, in other words, symptomatic of a crisis of travel. But as symptom,
it masks contradictions its author cannot resolve: aporias that are
not negated or overcome, but that remain paralyzing dilemmas in
the travelogue.
“Every story is a travel story,” Michel de Certeau has pointed out.14
We might say that Lévi-Strauss’s misgivings about telling his story
struggle with the discursive fatality that narrative must plot itself out
in space and time like a journey. More specifically, however, LéviStrauss’s rejection of travel expresses a defining exclusion upon which
his discipline is founded. As Fabian notes, “anthropology became an
academic discipline when scientific discourse replaced narration—
when, to put it simply, the monograph replaced the travelogue.”
Moreover, Fabian adds, this entailed “stationary fieldwork taking
the place of travel.” This replacement, Fabian insists, is no innocent
evolution but rather the result of a more suspicious “disavowal,”15
and his work undertakes a reevaluation of the discipline in light of
its traveling precursors, the missionaries, explorers, and amateur
ethnographers who laid the groundwork for modern anthropology. Fabian proposes a rehabilitation of these travelogues, while at
the same time offering some of the most incisive demystifications
of the ideology of travel by examining the complex and multiform
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practices of knowledge construction in the field. Fabian is thus able
to avoid the symptomatic rejection of travel and offers instead a more
nuanced view of its complexities in his study of explorers’ accounts,
Out of Our Minds. Interestingly for our purposes, this entails a reconsideration of travel and motion as they relate to immobility and
stasis: “What is difficult to reconcile with the image of the intrepid
traveler is that much, probably most, travel was stationary.” This
distinction allows Fabian to challenge anthropology’s disavowal of
travel and the travelogue. “Both travel and stay, motion and stillness
. . . shaped these expeditions. This would be a truism, except for
the realization that, while movement defined expeditions ideologically, in practice stops took up by far the larger portion of the total
time spent.” By displacing and reversing the opposition of travel
and stasis, Fabian applies a deconstructive strategy to his reading
of the genealogy of ethnography; the myth of exploration, he says,
“calls for deconstructive literary analysis.”16 But the deconstructive
strategy of reversal and displacement, a key method in destabilizing
the terms of a founding opposition, is only a means to a further
critical aim: that of undoing the opposition itself and its binary
logic. To do so would be to articulate another relation of mobility
and stasis, of travel and stillness, one that I am pursuing here and
call paralysis.
Paralysis is a recurrent symptom of the modern crisis of travel.
Index of travel’s exhaustion as theme and mode of knowledge, paralysis is travel’s ordeal, a trial suffered and undergone by the traveling
subject, an experience less object of knowledge than symptom of
the traveler’s unwitting passion. Paralysis is what remains of travel,
what holds back and stays the traveler beset by contradictions. In
this sense, and despite its negative connotations, paralysis remains
close to travel’s etymology in the French word travail, for labor,
toil, and torment. Travail itself derives from the Latin trepalium,
an instrument of torture, from which French also draws the word
entraver: to shackle, impede, and restrain. The travails of travel
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thus originate, as one etymologist ingenuously has it, in “the toil
of travelling in olden times.”17 However, we might add, this toil is
no less mythic than historical; in literature and mythology, travel’s
ordeals are sanctioned by theological and metaphysical motifs relating to sacred terrors, rites of passage, and mortal trespass. Within
this metaphysical horizon, only difficulty, or indeed impossibility,
would seem to consecrate a journey worth relating. Paralysis, then,
would be travel’s negative companion, but by a ruse common to
our dialectical and metaphysical heritage, its negating power would
serve a redemptive logic of useful toil, salutary travail, and mortal
trespass. To read against the grain of this redemptive logic would
be to consider paralysis otherwise than as negation or difficulty to
overcome.
Derrida once ventured the term paralyse for the form of reading
and interpretation called forth by such paths of thought.18 In texts
on Freud’s death drive and Blanchot’s fictions, Derrida discerns a
logic of death and negativity that articulates a different figure of
death as border, and thus of the metaphysical figures of motion
organized there, including transgression, mortal trespass, survival,
and passing on. Paralyse, or paralysis, dwells at this border that
yields nondialectical figures of mobility and stasis: pas, démarche,
and dérive are among the duplicitous terms that Derrida employs
to name these problematic border crossings. To think, as to travel,
would be “the experience of the aporia,” neither stopping at the
impasse nor passing beyond it, in the attempt to reckon with the
paralyzing trace of the path.19 What Derrida says of Blanchot in
“Pas” might well be extended to a broader scope of texts: “If a science or a theory of reading these narratives were to constitute itself,
coming round in the end, or resorting to its name, I would call it
paralysis [la paralyse].”20 Paralyse suggests itself here as a near-synonym
for Derrida’s own methodology, though Derrida qualifies his own
statement with conditional verbs, and his “en venir à son nom” is
rife with ambiguities. If Derrida subsequently took his distance
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from the term, this retraction is already anticipated here, and is not
unlike his hesitation in committing to a master term for what came
to be called deconstruction. Paralyse, in other words, goes “under
erasure.”21 Other terms thus challenge the singularity of paralyse:
contre-allée, for instance, combines, in aporetic form, the ideas of
both traveling “with” and “against.”22 Adopting the orphan term
paralyse for my own purposes here, Paralyses will demonstrate its
broad resonance with the discourse and cultural politics of modern
French travel.23
“Molloy in the Amazon.” If I am stuck on this image it is due
to the crisis of travel it captures, and because, linking ethnography
and literature in one stroke, it emblematizes the textual analysis and
politics of translation that have become hallmarks of contemporary
critical anthropology. This image also stays with me because the
name of Beckett is tied to the most difficult and challenging figurations of paralytic motion. Clastres may well have been thinking
of Foucault when he penned his lines, since “The Discourse on
Language,” which was published shortly before Clastres’s own text,
also begins with a Beckettian reference: “I must go on; I can’t go
on; I must go on; I must say words as long as there are words, I
must say them until they find me, until they say me—heavy burden,
heavy sin; I must go on . . .”24 At grips with discourse, obligation,
and sin, Beckett’s contradictions and perplexities serve to develop
Foucault’s argument on the will to truth, conceived as an ordering
of discourse by means of strategic systems of exclusion. Foucault
allows us to reconsider Lévi-Strauss’s denial of travel as symptom
of the will to truth and its denial of power and desire. “I hate travelling and explorers. Yet here I am proposing to tell the story of my
expeditions.” This contradiction, Fabian would argue, structures
anthropological knowledge as a constitutive aporia. In Lévi-Strauss’s
autobiographical salvo we hear, in other words, the anonymous
voice of anthropology echoing that of Beckett’s character: “I must
go on; I can’t go on . . .”
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It is ironic that Beckett’s famous epigram should have become a
password of sorts, translated by many commentators into all-toomeaningful statements about futility and the absurd. On the other
hand, the emphasis is warranted, since Beckett remained doggedly
attached to such statements, from his earliest works to Worstward
Ho. The latter text’s minimalist reiteration of The Unnamable strikingly renders its epigram as the alternating play, at once chiastic and
aporetic, of the two mere words “no” and “on.”25 Only in recent
years have critics taken Beckett’s paralytic statements as more than
negations or contradictions. Leslie Hill, for instance, observes that
“all Beckett’s protagonists set out on a journey which ends in an
impasse,” and adds that to read the journey’s impasse thematically
and teleologically would be to confer on Beckett’s travels a progression and destination they deny at every step. As Hill points out,
“Beckett’s rewriting of the quest narrative is not an attempt just to
toy with the forms of the past,” but reflects instead “an aporetic crisis
in the whole articulation of subjective space.” What Hill calls “a
system of self-cancelling alternatives” is characteristic of this aporetic
crisis. “The space of journeying, like writing, becomes a space of
indifference, . . . of movements made and then undone, advanced
but annulled, of opposites set up and then abolished, of unity assumed and then divided.”26 Interestingly, as Hill’s own commentary
shows, it is seemingly impossible to convey these aporias without
asserting a sequence of textual moves (“and then, and then”), so that
the critic himself falls in with Beckett’s double injunction “I can’t”
and “I must.” This is what Leo Bersani calls “impeded reading,” an
effect of the Beckettian text’s self-obstruction.27 Bersani sees these
impediments as enabling, through the near-ruin of representation,
access to domains of affective experience repressed by narrative’s
ordering principles and spatiotemporal coordinates. Beckett’s paralyses thus do not simply negate travel or motion but allow for
other transports at the limits of representation.
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Travel and narrative are intimately linked. To tamper with the
narrative codes of travel, as Beckett does, is to challenge the basic
storylines with which we order our lives. Accordingly, the aim of
the following chapters is to show how paralyses undo the certainties of knowledge, presenting alternatives to the normative codings of travel, transports, and narrative. These alternatives, raised
in moments of paralysis, may be political, sexual, or affective. At
the limit—and paralysis always concerns a problematic limit—what
presents itself may be more than a mere option and a decision; the
alternative instead poses the challenge of the radically other. For
this reason my focus has been on anthropological discourse, which
traditionally concerns other worlds, other peoples, and other times.
Anthropology thus has an implicitly ethical bent, oriented as it is
toward the strange, the foreign, and the other. At the same time,
however, one may argue that the ethical relationship is incomplete
unless it calls language into question, unmastering the account one
makes of the journey and the encounter. For this reason, as Fabian
notes, language is a vital companion to the anthropological journey, not as a mere stylistic turn but as an exploration of the limits
of language, narrative, and knowledge. Attuned to the “poetics” of
its practice, anthropology today increasingly figures itself as a mode
of cultural translation.28 Translation, of course, implies transport:
trans (across) and latus (borne) suggests a spatial transfer of meaning across languages. The figure and the practice always have an
essentializing tendency, however, as what seems to be carried over is
the “spirit” of the letter, not the material particularity of the source
text. Translators have long been aware of this conundrum, of course,
but only contemporary theory has been able to articulate the properly paralyzing implications of translation as a task both impossible
and necessary. In recent years, and in response to the challenge of
poststructuralist ethics, translation studies have complicated the
classical model of translation as travel, suggesting that a certain
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untranslatability is the measure of fidelity and responsibility. “The
translator’s task is inevitably an ethical one,” Sandra Bermann says,
while recognizing that “language imposes internal barriers to appropriative understanding as well as to transparent communication.”
Translation, accordingly, is modeled less on metaphors of transport
and delivery than on figures of interweaving and imbrication, in
which the unmasterable otherness of the translator’s language links
with the unassimilable idiom of the other. “Linguistic ligatures,”
in Bermann’s words,29 being “tied up or trussed,” and “entwined”
in a “tangle,” in Spivak’s, speak to new models of translation as
the paralyzing weave of a double bind.30 Confronting such binds,
the journey comes to a halt, breaking down, as Judith Butler has it,
paralyzing travel and narrative alike in an encounter that remains,
even in its ethical responsibility, unnarratable and paradoxically
unaccountable.31
Roland Barthes poses this challenge to travel and narrative in s/z,
where he asks us to imagine the story of a journey without arrival
or departure. Staying without arriving; traveling without departing; neither arriving or not: Barthes’s paradoxical journey defies
the normative codes of narrative and suggests the “self-cancelling
alternatives” Hill ascribes to Beckett. “A scandal of readerliness,”
as Barthes puts it,32 such a journey would thus no doubt provoke
Bersani’s “impeded reading” as well. Barthes’s narrative mutations
are more than a mere aesthetic concern. At stake in such questioning
of travel and narrative is the invention of mobilities that defy travel’s
presumed spatiotemporal coordinates and their normative coding
in narratives of desire, conquest, and exploration. Such paradoxical
transports, moreover, provide the means to understand new mutations of travel that contemporary commentators may be ill equipped
to conceptualize. Indeed, new technologies raise the stakes in this
effort to reconceive modern travel. Take, for instance, the formulations of Paul Virilio, whose diagnoses of modern technology’s paradoxical transports seemingly echo the words of Barthes: “Currently
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. . . we are seeing the beginnings of a ‘generalized arrival’ whereby
everything arrives without having to leave, the nineteenth-century’s
elimination of the journey . . . combining with the abolition of departure at the end of the twentieth, the journey thereby losing its
successive components and being overtaken by arrival alone.” Unlike
Barthes, Virilio’s willful paradoxes of transport (“static vehicle,”
“virtual velocity,” etc.) ultimately appeal to outmoded theological
and metaphysical grounding: the “soul” and the “here and now.”
Virilio’s paralyses thus fall in with the mournful tone of Clastres
and Lévi-Strauss in his nostalgia for what he calls “the essence of
the path, the journey,” and “the voyage of the navigator or the trek
of the lone explorer.”33
Modernity has long been equated with movement, change, and
instability, whether in Marx’s sobering diagnosis of the economic
disequilibrium fostered by capital or the Futurists’ rapturous embrace
of speed.34 And while this modern predicament has always provoked
resistance and prompted reflection on the value of tradition and
stability, such responses often tend to fall back on nostalgic tropes,
even when, as in Virilio, they compulsively invoke figures of paradox.
Virilio’s paradoxes should, however, be answered not in the mode
of nostalgia, but instead in a more critical—and playful—spirit.
Ross Chambers’s Loiterature contributes to such an effort, drawing on Beckett to advance what he calls a “poetics of digression.”
Digressiveness is not only wayward and wandering, Chambers says,
but is marked by a tendency toward narrative slowness and stasis.
“Loiterature,” as Chambers names it, is a potential feature of any
text, but is most characteristic of literary modernity, whose slowness and digressions constitute disorderly challenges to the order of
proper narrative, and as such, express errant pleasures that contest
the rules of discursive conduct and social rectitude. The subversive
force and elusive charm of such texts lie in skirting the norm and
testing limits, rather than in confronting the law. As Chambers
says, “there is a type of practice, the digressive, that perhaps offers

Buy the Book

16

i n t roduc t ion

a model of how the law can be more effectively subverted, since in
it something that does not manifest itself as subversive nevertheless
has the power to put the law into question.”35 Digression, then, is
an alternative to the frontal assault of transgression, and if it gives
up the path of confrontation, it gains, however, in its room for play
and seduction.
The subversiveness of Chambers’s loiterature and the poetics of
digression owe something to the poststructuralist turn in the analysis
of power and dissidence, and in particular to Foucault, for whom
power is not simply wielded, confronted, or endured, but distributed in more complex ways among disciplinary subjects. Foucault’s
“A Preface to Transgression” sets out the program for this study of
power in an homage to Bataille. Chambers himself refers to Bataille
in drawing a distinction between transgression and digression, stating that, unlike digression, “transgression and the law are intimately
bound up with each other such that the law requires transgression
as that which confirms its status as law” (Loiterature, 89). Chambers’s account of Bataille posits a mutually defining relationship
between law and transgression that, however, returns Bataille to
the very dialectical system he aimed to undo. For Bataille, after all,
transgression is not dialectical but aporetic; like Blanchot, Bataille
insists on the impossibility of transgression that brings the dialectic
to a standstill.36 Consequently, Chambers’s wandering digression,
such as he defines it, is insufficiently distinguished from the transgression he would oppose. Moreover, digression merges with the
dialectical transgression he attributes to Bataille, for if digression
exploits “loopholes” in the law, Chambers says, “the loophole that
it represents in the law is itself subject to a law: the law of loopholes.
And the law of loopholes is that they are, in turn, constrained by the
very order that they disturb” (Loiterature, 93–94). Paralysis, as feature
of Beckettian digression, is thus cast as a dialectical confrontation
of opposites, and, indeed, a “metaphysical paralysis,” as Chambers
says (100). Chambers thus speaks of a “paralysis—etymologically, a
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“coming loose” or “coming unstrung”—that simultaneously alludes
to a desired inertia and signifies the impossibility of its attainment,
for this paralysis is a state of suspension that derives from digression’s oxymoronic pull toward a state of stasis, on the one hand,
and a need to move or even a desire to progress, that is, to move
on, on the other” (93). If, as Chambers correctly notes, Beckett’s
fiction is both paralyzed and “aporetic” (101), Chambers’s account
of its digressive stasis remains wedded to formulations of opposition and contradiction. Chambers’s analysis of Beckett is thus
another case of “impeded reading,” provoked by the challenge of
such paradoxical expressions as Beckett’s “gress,” “gression,” and
“moving pause.” In reference to the latter, Chambers says, “such
a busy pause is the opposite of stasis: it is a suspension” (101). This
supposed opposition, unconvincing in itself, seems a symptom of
a reading that insists on a play of contraries, even where Beckett
defies them. Chambers’s account of Beckett’s narrative thus inadvertently mirrors the critic’s own difficult critical choices in the face
of textual undecidability. “Constantly making choices—whether
to go in or to come out, whether to move or to stay put, whether
to move in this direction or that—but making choices in a world
in which there is no reason to prefer any particular option over its
alternative, results in aporia.”
Such impeded reading is the almost inevitable consequence of
reading Beckett’s strange transports. But were we to pursue Chambers’s “law of loopholes” with Derrida, a way out of the stalemate
of sheer contradiction might be found. Paralysis as a “coming unstrung” would likewise yield a different sense than that of loosening
or unlacing; Derrida proposes instead a model of “stricture” and
“destricturation” that is paralyzing, precisely, due to its undecidability, as seen in his essay on Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s
boots. Derrida’s essay is digressive in an exemplary way: stubbornly
off-topic, it dwells at length on what seems trivial and virtually
irrelevant, ignored by Heidegger, and insists on a slowness that is
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nearly immobile: “We’re getting nowhere. We’re not even sliding
around, we’re floundering [Nous piétinons. Nous ne patinons même
pas, nous pataugons]).”37 The critic willingly trudges and flounders,
the latter verb less evocative of Heidegger’s privileged terms “way”
and “soil,” no doubt, than Beckett’s mud. In the course of this
slow, but never slow enough reading, what emerges, in a manner
characteristic of Derrida, is the seemingly marginal detail in the
painting that displaces and eclipses the whole: in this case, the
shoelaces. The lace (lacet) is also a snare (lacet), one that sets a trap:
“Another type of trap and of what in ‘Pas’ was named paralysis [la
paralyse].”38 The lacing of the boots, their passing in and out of
eyelets in crisscross fashion, provides Derrida a model for thinking
of a linking and differentiating that is beyond the logic of duality,
opposition, and dialectic. The “pair” of boots is thus only the first
pairing that calls for deconstruction, and which includes margin/
center, inside/outside, representation/represented, part/whole. The
interlacing is a nonoppositional and differential relation that, like
the framing parergon, links inside to outside, only to confound the
two, according to “the figure or trajectory of the lace: a stricture by
alternate and reversible passage from inside to outside, from under
to over” (Truth in Painting, 321). The shoelaces thus provide another
model, crucial to Derrida, of a chiastic interlacing of asymmetrical
terms.39 Such is the paralyzing logic of the margin: delimiting the
border of a given work, it simultaneously unworks that border and
the distinctions it would support. “The picture is caught in the lace
which it yet seems to include as its part” (Truth in Painting, 331).
Nothing is more natural than to trip on these shoelaces which,
both tight and loose, differentiate every pairing without opposing,
contrasting, or negating: “the trap always works in the interlace,
whether it misleads, lets go, or paralyzes.”40
It is with such a paralyzing trap that Derrida opens his famous
critique of Lévi-Strauss’s Amazon journeys in Of Grammatology.
Tristes Tropiques delivers a compelling version of anthropology’s fatal
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contact narrative, cast by Lévi-Strauss as the violent intrusion of
writing into the world of the Nambikwara. As Derrida argues, this
representation of writing as contaminating agent is allied to one of
metaphysics’ most pervasive claims, the opposition between writing
and speech, an opposition that articulates some of the fundamental
distinctions of metaphysical thought. In Lévi-Strauss’s account, the
fatal contact with writing supports a portrait of the Nambikwara
as innocent, autonomous, and natural. But writing, as constitutive
exclusion of Western thought, troubles the vital distinctions it would
claim to uphold, and vitiates, indeed, the very object of traditional
anthropology: the “primitive,” or “peoples without writing.” For
Derrida, these distinctions are troubled at the outset by the path
that leads to the Nambikwara, opening their world to the outside;
indeed, writing is inscribed in this very path. Quoting from LéviStrauss, Derrida stops him, so to speak, in his track: “a picada (a
crude trail whose ‘track’ is ‘not easily distinguished from the bush’).”
Derrida suggests that “one should meditate upon all of the following
together: writing as the possibility of the road and of difference, the
history of writing and the history of the road, of the rupture, of the
via rupta, of the path that is broken, beaten, fracta, of the space of
reversibility and of repetition traced by the opening, the divergence
from, and the violent spacing, of nature.” As a consequence, Derrida says, “it is difficult to imagine that access to the possibility of a
road-map is not at the same time access to writing.”41 The logic of
the trace, here, follows the meanings of “path” and “footprint” that
have become obsolete, or nearly so, in English.42 By anticipating
writing in this way, the native path brings the anthropologist up
short in his quest. Moreover, if the “territory of the Nambikwara
is crossed by the line of an autochthonic picada,” as Derrida says,
the word “crossed” (traversé) suggests not only crossing through but
crossing out: a line, that is, lying as much across the path as it does
along it. The native path, in other words, confronts the traveler with
an aporia: both line of demarcation and passageway, a line that both
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marks vital distinctions and passes through them. Neither writing
nor speech, the native path is the trace of what Derrida calls “archewriting” or “arche-violence,” inscribing the inevitable loss of the
proper that Lévi-Strauss’s moral fables and Clastres’s “archeology
of violence” narrate in the mode of mourning. The native path
as aporia, deconstructing the anthropologist’s moral plaints, thus
provides another means to understand what Renato Rosaldo has
called “imperialist nostalgia.” Rather than being mere hypocrisy
or bad faith of the anthropologist, Rosaldo’s “mourning for what
one has destroyed”43 should be traced back to the path as entame
that both “breaches” and “broaches,” as Spivak’s translation has
it, in one stroke. Instead of merely immobilizing the traveler, “the
experience of the aporia,” Derrida says in one of his texts on mourning, “gives or promises the thinking of the path.”44 Accordingly, Of
Grammatology reclaims Rousseau from Lévi-Strauss, for whom the
philosopher represents the founder of ethnology.45 Derrida instead
argues that the crucial contribution of Rousseau lies not in his theories of natural man or his mournful critique of cultural decline, but
rather in the duplicitous figures, such as the supplement, that waylay
his philosophy, narratives, and travels.46
Attention to such a paralyzing logic exposes a thread common to
modern narratives of travel: a tendency toward stasis that belies the
journey and its ostensible purpose. In touristic narratives, moments of
stasis tend to express, in symptomatic form, the traveler’s conventional
frustrations: a bid for originality and authenticity always threatened
by rivalry and mediation; an experience of otherness frustrated by
mere spectacle and convention; and a desire to capture history from
within a touristic consciousness blind to its own historical nature.
In this way, frustrated travel is at grips with difficulties all too easily
overcome—if only by compensatory illusions—or alternately, too
readily taken as sheer obstacle. Paralysis, however, expresses more
than contradiction; as we have seen, its aporias expose the stymied
traveler to what is both necessary and impossible in transport and
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translation. These aporias lie in the very track of the traveler as they
do the unaccountable trace of his narrative. If, as Ross Chambers has
argued, literature is by nature dilatory and slow, paralyses could be
considered, in their insouciance to difficulty, an expression of the
loiterly and playful resources of literary writing. The tragic aspect
of paralyses would be the counterpart to this tendency: not a loiterly playing with transgression, but a painful confrontation with
absolute limitations. Aporia, however, expresses neither of these
options. Only a reading that is slow enough, indeed paralyzed,
can account for the transports of the paralyzed traveler. Paralysis,
then, is not only the object of these studies but the name of their
critical approach.
Hesitations
My argument so far has drawn on Western travels to show how the
encounter with the other provokes a breakdown in the journey and
its narrative. I have argued that such breakdowns stage an ethical
encounter that, however, often remains incomplete and symptomatic. The task of a paralyzed reading is to dwell at such problematic
moments in the text to bring out the text’s implicit challenge to
its own motives, drives, and transports. Postcolonial authors, for
their part, have rewritten narratives of travel to contest and subvert
accounts of Western discovery and conquest. Such postcolonial
journeys are a critical counterpoint to Western travel, exploiting
the contradictions and lapses of the colonial vision. And while contestation and subversion are valuable resources in this challenge
to the norms of travel, some of the most far-reaching postcolonial
critiques lie not only in political opposition but also in an exploration of shared complicities and knotted histories. For such writers,
as in our examples so far, discovery and conquest may become the
site of a paralyzing encounter as well.
James Clifford has shown how the contemporary Native American is constrained by a double bind whose logic demands that the
aboriginal be utterly different—at the risk of isolation and death—yet
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make himself known in the language and culture of the colonizer—
at the risk of losing his identity. To escape this double bind Clifford
suggests that “along with the history of resistances we need a history
of hesitations.”47 Such hesitations may not be the stuff of adventure and drama, but are the persistent and necessary strategies of
survival that defy the either-or logic of resistance and submission,
assimilation and isolation. Even a story of postcolonial revolution,
such as C. L. R. James’s The Black Jacobins, confirms Clifford’s “history of hesitations”; James aptly speaks of Toussaint L’Ouverture as
embodying “vacillation” at a key point in his struggle for Haitian
independence from France.48 What Clifford calls hesitation I have,
for my part, been calling paralysis. Paralysis lies at the crux of the
matter, a place of crossed identities and crossed destinies, where
decisions are made in the absence of clear alternatives, where vital distinctions are needed yet lacking. This crux, moreover, has
the crisscross form of a double bind. I would argue, then, that its
paralyzing logic is not so easily dispatched, and indeed provides
the means to articulate a way beyond the alternatives of aboriginal
resistance and opposition.
Such a paralyzing crux is found in Jamaica Kincaid’s “In History,”
an essay that revisits the journeys of discovery to the New World.
Claiming that all modern history bears the trace of slavery and the
slave trade, Kincaid says she would like to mark that trace with an
asterisk. The asterisk would indicate where a footnote to the “official story” of Western travel is needed.49 What Kincaid modestly
calls her own “addition” to this official history does not, however,
do justice to the transformations and displacements this footnote
would entail, which her searching, wide-ranging, and allusive text
amply proves. Such a footnote cannot simply be added, since it would
threaten to undermine and overflow the official story. The asterisk
thus indicates an impossible yet necessary addition. Moreover, the
spot marked by this asterisk is not that of a place or a boundary; it
is, like the crux, that of a limit both crossed over and crossed out.
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The crux, then, does not simply mark the spot; its crosswise suture
marks instead an overlapping of sites, histories, and identities. To
encounter the crux is to be paralyzed.
In her imaginary journey home to her native island of Antigua,
Kincaid tries to imagine her people and her land as seen through
the eyes of Columbus. At the same time, traveling with Columbus,
she tries to counter that discovery with her own claiming of Antigua, to “speak of it as if no one has ever heard of it before” (“In
History,” 3). The journey thus mimes that of Columbus, yet aims
instead at an undiscovered aboriginal Antigua. Is this other, older
Antigua “in” history, or outside of it? Can Kincaid’s asterisk displace
what is already, as she says, a “footnote” to history in Columbus’s
own account, his passing mention of her island? And her footnote
to this footnote, can it find a proper place in the text of history?
Kincaid’s journey home is a belated return, of course, and so finds
itself on the side of colonial history, its language, and its texts. Her
discovery can only be a rediscovery of Antigua, and a return not to
her home but only to the moment of fatal contact, perhaps to the
very line of demarcation between a historical before and after. But it
would be too simple to assert that Kincaid’s belatedness condemns
her to this side of history, much as she insists that it is “the human
imagination that I am familiar with, the only one that dominates
the world in which I live.” Kincaid’s asterisk indicates, instead, a
point of discrepant history, where the myths of travel and progress
are shadowed by another temporality. Indeed, the asterisk does
not allow for a clear demarcation of a historical before and after, of
the time of a people without history and that of Western history.
Kincaid’s belatedness is, rather, that of a continuous present, the
postcolonial moment of an “open wound” that sutures and divides
past and future, “each breath I take in and expel healing and opening
the wound again and again, over and over” (1). Kincaid’s journey is
thus neither simply opposed to that of Columbus, nor fated to follow in its wake. Rather, it finds its subversive potential in traveling
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“tout contre” (right next to/completely against), as Derrida says, in
the strange complicity of a paralyzing “counterpath.”
Due to her predicament of belatedness, Kincaid’s pared down,
disarmingly simple language is marked with duplicity and repetition
even at the crucial moment in her imaginary journey when she arrives home. “What were the things growing on the land?” Kincaid
asks. “I pause for this. What were the things growing on that land
and why do I pause for this?” (“In History,” 3). The “why” of Kincaid’s pausing is as important here as the “what” she indicates. This
pause, hesitation, or paralysis is more than an occasion to stop and
take stock of a momentous occasion. It indicates, rather, what defies
indication, and even the index of an asterisk. The minimal alteration of “the land” to “that land” is pregnant with this impossible
referent: the home as seen by the other, where her people suddenly
“make an appearance” in history, but also, simultaneously, the one
unknown to history, to which Kincaid also claims to belong. This
is surely a decisive moment, for the appearance of her people foretells the impending consequences of genocide, slavery, and, more
recently, the neocolonial economy of tourism. A decisive moment
Kincaid would surely choose to change. Why, then, her indecision
and hesitation? What gives pause here is not simply that the past
cannot be altered, that the fatal contact has already occurred, but
that Kincaid’s voice cannot extricate itself from the crux that binds
her aboriginal land to its simultaneous appearance and disappearance
in the text of history. This is, moreover, the same double bind that
requires that she voice her story from within the story of her own
eradication. Kincaid thus speaks from the place of the subaltern,
where the voice of counterhistory expresses what is constitutively
erased or foreclosed from history, and confronts that erasure as the
enabling condition of her speech. In this postcolonial paradox, she
attempts to reclaim, in the language of colonization, an identity
destroyed by that language. In a sense, her reclaiming of her history and her home owes itself to the erasure of that history, and
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her journey with Columbus simply revisits the erasure of her home.
This does not amount, of course, to a submission to that language
and its history, but neither is it the dialectical overturning of that
history. It is, instead, a voice that articulates itself with the trace
of the other, a trace that cannot be authored or appropriated. This
postcolonial predicament makes Kincaid herself, like her homeland,
an ambiguous referent, “I, me,” both subject and object, fixed in
the gaze of the uncomprehending other, yet stubbornly claiming
recognition: “the person you see before you” (“In History,” 4); “the
person standing in front of you” (3).
Kincaid’s insistence on her present visual appearance, marked by
her black and aboriginal heritage, is a claim to history in the name
of “all who look like me” (“In History,” 1). To make this claim
the text thus narrows in on the very moment of discovery when,
Kincaid says, “I and the people who look like me begin to make an
appearance” (4). A repetitive and obsessive motif in Kincaid’s text,
this “making an appearance” is the ironic moment of a discovery
that grants yet denies identity, that recognizes only through misrecognition: the postcolonial legacy of Columbus, “who started
the narrative from which I trace my beginning.” Kincaid does not,
however, bow to the necessity of this beginning, since she insists as
well on speaking from the standpoint of one who is “not yet in the
picture” and, indeed, claims that “I have not yet made an appearance” (1). This is more than an attempt to turn back the clock of
history or to defy the narrative of “discovery.” It is, rather, to dwell
at the crux of discovery, to “trace my beginning” to the moment
of encounter, a moment that is also, moreover, that of her present
appearance “standing in front of you.” Kincaid’s rebellious text thus
makes a scene, talking back to history, but does not simply claim or
reclaim a lost or neglected identity. Instead, she marks the trace of
her beginning, a trace that neither appears or not: the trace, in other
words, of a “pre-emergent” self, to use Gayatri Spivak’s formulation,
which testifies to an identity foreclosed by history.50 This trace lies
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in the margins of Columbus’s journey, and as “a reader of this account of the journey” (“In History,” 2) Kincaid occupies the place
of Columbus’s foreclosed other, the Antiguan native. Kincaid’s evocation of the Antiguan aboriginal would, then, be neither fiction
nor history, but rather, in Spivak’s terms, “the (im)possibility of a
vicarious (un)reading, the perspective of the “native informant”
(Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 35).
Kincaid’s “In History” indeed provides a striking illustration of
Spivak’s theory of the “native informant.” The native informant, as
Spivak defines it, is neither the data-providing interlocutor of the
ethnographer nor the postcolonial agent of an autonomous speech
act. Rather, the native informant lies in the margins of the dominant
discourse of Western history as a figure paradoxically necessary to
the truth-claims of that discourse, yet occluded from the scene.
This “foreclosure” is thus more than a denial or a disavowal of the
other; it is, instead, the mark of a structuring absence upon which
the dominant text depends. Like Kincaid reading Columbus, Spivak
reads Kant for evidence of the aboriginal “raw man,” and shows
that “Rhetorically crucial at the most important moment in the
argument, it is not part of the argument in any way” (Critique of
Postcolonial Reason, 13). Strictly speaking, there is no “arguing” with
this discrepancy in Kant; Spivak thus warns against the “opposition between master and native” (37) that can unwittingly produce
a mere “legitimation-by-reversal” (39). The postcolonial critic’s task
is, instead, to move “from opposition to critique” and explore the
“complicities” that bind the master discourse to its others (147). I
have argued that Kincaid’s crux is the index of such a complicity
with history’s official story. Similarly, Spivak’s “complicity” is the
place at which Kant’s text relies on an aboriginal other—the Australian aboriginal and the South American Fuegan—that it nonetheless forecloses. These paralyzing contradictions in Kant’s text are
overcome all too easily in the “axiomatics of imperialism” (34) that
consigns the other to a mere supplement. An important moment
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in Spivak’s critique comes when she tries to take stock of the history and culture of the aboriginals Kant summarily dismisses. This
entails a long footnote on colonialism and anthropology that runs
to four pages: “the manuscript got stalled for years,” Spivak says,
admitting that “I cannot write that other book that bubbles up in
the cauldron of Kant’s contempt” (28). Like Kincaid’s asterisk, this
footnote indexes an infinite labor in the margins of official history:
“a parenthesis, in a note, on the note on a note” (48).51 This infinite
supplementarity, both paralyzing and motivating, follows the trace
of the other in the master discourse.
Kincaid’s voice is thus a testimony to what Spivak calls the founding foreclosure of the aboriginal in colonial thought and Western
reason. A challenge to Columbus’s appropriating mission, the crux
of Kincaid’s text indexes what cannot be claimed or reclaimed, an
aboriginal world more ancient than Antigua itself: the trace of the
other that resists historical appropriation and persists as the infinite
supplement to history and the postcolonial present. Kincaid’s opposition is asymmetrical to colonial history in that it does not presume
to reappropriate the aboriginal or claim redress or reparations. And
yet, of course, the wounds of history can inform political action in
favor of the aboriginal. This aboriginal is, however, not only the
victim of violence, but also the testimony to an “arche-violence”
more ancient even than Antigua.52 To speak as an ab-original is to
speak as one deriving from an origin that can be neither appropriated nor denied. To speak for the oppressed is thus to take sides
where sides are lacking, where the crisscross suture “heal[s] and
open[s] the wound again and again.” Talking back to Empire and
writing her way back home, Kincaid testifies to the impossibility
of any simple return address. Indeed, her text seems finally to circle
only around a handful of paralyzing questions: “and now how to
go on,” she asks in a Beckettian vein (“In History,” 6); “What to
call the thing that happened to me?”; “Should I call it history?” (1);
“what is history?” (2). These paralyzing questions touch on what is
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perhaps the very origin of Kincaid’s text. “It is almost as if what is
told,” Spivak says, “is the result of an obstinate misunderstanding
of the rhetorical question that transforms the condition of the (im)
possibility of answering—of telling the story—into the condition of
its possibility. Every production of experience, thought, knowledge,
all humanistic production, perhaps especially the representation
of the subaltern in history or literature, has this double bind at its
origin.”53 Out of this origin, always a supplement, Kincaid voices
the necessary yet impossible claiming of her aboriginal home. Her
faltering prose undermines both the journey and its telling to narrate
not a return but a departure from the certainties of home, origin,
and belonging.
And yet, departure too loses its conventional bearings as a result
of this absent origin. The figures of transport provoked by this
predicament are necessarily vexed, but still enable mobile tactics
of identification and desire. For Glissant, such mobile tactics arise
precisely from the lack of any possibility of a return, and in the
promise of a Caribbean identity free of the illusion of an original
self. In Glissant’s terms, “reversion” to an origin is thus expressed in
duplicitous “diversions,” themselves oriented toward an “entanglement” akin to Kincaid’s paralyzing crux. “Diversion,” Glissant says,
“is nourished by reversion: not a return to the longing for origins,
to some immutable state of Being, but a return to the point of entanglement, from which we were forcefully turned away.” Due to
this insight, even the most violent cuts do not call for reunification,
but rather for a closer attention to a visceral entanglement. “The
machete, more twisted than knotted entrails.”54 Voicing a historical
trauma, Kincaid invites us “to listen to departure,” as Cathy Caruth
puts it, calling on us to bear the responsibility for a traumatic event
and a singular place that are always belated, always displaced, but
which endure in the stubborn index of a historical asterisk.55
“Only the impossible can make me still,” Kincaid says in A Small
Place. Litotic and devastating by turns, Kincaid’s searing monologue
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buttonholes the tourist and confronts his insouciant pleasures with
the postcolonial realities of Antiguan life.56 To be “still” is not so
much a desire for calm and repose as it is the demand coming from
an ignorant and tormenting other—the touristic “you” of Kincaid’s
insubordinate address—that she stop her ranting and retribution.57
Here the polemical “you” is the site of another entanglement that
Kincaid, for all her righteous hostility, cannot solve, since her own
language embodies the hateful colonizing other from whom she
wants to extricate herself. And yet within that entanglement surely
the promise of another stillness is voiced, that of a hoped-for peace
and resolution that could finally heal her wounds. In this sense,
then, Kincaid asks for the impossible: a stillness that will not stop,
and a “way” that can only be traveled in the travails of language,
voiced in a rhetorical question that does not know whether it questions, affirms, or denies: “only the impossible can make me still:
can a way be found to make what happened not have happened?”
(32). There is no solution here, no analysis that that can assuage
Kincaid’s paralyses. The cherished name “Antigua”—translation,
misnomer, and erasure of the proper—is the postcolonial allegory
of this quest for selfhood, defying the claims of the explorer and
tourist yet unclaimed by Kincaid herself, whose countervoyage is
too aware of its fateful entanglement not to persist in demanding
the impossible.
Transgressions
French literature forms the basis of this study of paralyzed travel,
which spans a period from the early nineteenth century to the postcolonial present. As shown by our examples from Beckett and Kincaid, however, paralyses of travel are not limited to the French context.
And yet it is in this context, and particularly in French modernity,
that the critique of travel and paralytic transports becomes a culturally dominant motif. Moreover, French modernity provides both
the most striking symptoms of paralysis and their most insightful
critical theories. The French example serves here, then, both as a
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singular case and as an example with which to compare other cultural
instances of travel’s paralyses. This raises an interesting problem
of cultural comparison and translation, however. If translation in
its classical sense implies the transfer of meaning across cultural
codes, such transfers and transports are called into question by
travel’s paralyses. As mode of cultural translation, paralysis dwells
on the untranslated: that which does not cross borders, that which
does not carry over. This is not to imply, however, that paralyses
simply impede communication and reinforce cultural closure and
singularity. Rather, paralyses prevent the facile transfer of meanings at the expense of language’s figural thickets. It is, indeed, in
the thickets of language that one reads the symptom as “a failure
of translation,” to borrow Freud’s expression.58 Extending Freud’s
notion of the symptom to a cultural level, one may speak of cultural
“failures of translation” that bring travel to a halt. Far from remaining
unmoved and static, however, the “to-be-translated,” as Laplanche
puts it, is the core of the desire to understand, communicate, and
travel (259). The “to-be-translated” is, in this sense, the very source
of the “drive to translate” (164), even if that source itself remains
unmoved and untranslated.59
A diagnosis of the specifically French cultural motif of paralysis
is provided by the Spanish critic José Ortega y Gasset in his 1925
The Dehumanization of Art, an early assessment and theorization
of modernism. Ortega calls the novel “a sluggish genre” that, in his
account, tends toward an increasing diminution of action, story,
and adventure in favor of the exploration of literary form, character,
and psychology.60 Conrad might be cited as a key instance of this
development; a hinge figure in literary modernism, Conrad exploits
the resources of traditional adventure tales but tends to stall his
journeys in reflexive psychological meditations.61 For Ortega, Proust
is the last great example, though an extreme one, of the modern
novel’s sluggishness. “So slowly does the action move,” Ortega says
of Proust, “that it seems more like a sequence of ecstatic stillnesses
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without progression” (Dehumanization of Art, 79). Indeed, in what
he calls Proust’s “paralytic novel” (87), “the permissible measure of
slowness is overstepped” (80). Some amount of action is necessary
to narrative, though Ortega approves its near-abolition in favor of
hermetic formalism and psychological analysis. Ortega’s modernist
manifesto thus contrasts the French tradition, including the rigor
of its classicism—as in the conversing “statues” of Racine’s plays
(73)—to the popular tradition of Spanish literature, still wedded in
his time to models of chivalry, adventure, and the picaresque.
The rejection of adventure and the picaresque is a common thread
in modern French literature, which voices an ironic doubt as to narratives of escape, adventure, and discovery. One may argue, further,
that the breakdown of plot and narrative characteristic of modern
literature corresponds to the demise of overarching spatiotemporal
narrative structures modeled on travel, adventure, and conquest.
This allows us to trace a longer genealogy to what Lyotard, in his
celebrated formulation of 1979, calls postmodernism’s “incredulity
toward metanarratives.” As Lyotard says, “the narrative function
is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal.”62 The political reasons for this rejection are
lacking, however, in Ortega’s analysis, though it betrays throughout
a suspicion of mass culture and popular forms of literature. At the
other end of the political spectrum, Michael Nerlich’s Ideology of
Adventure offers more pointed political reasons to critique the tradition of adventure. Nerlich argues that Western adventure narratives
were born in a transitional historical stage between feudalism and
early capitalism, Spain being a main context for this historic shift.
Having lost his role within the feudal system, the knight’s purpose
was glorified in narratives that emphasized honor and romance.
Interestingly, however, the rise of the tale of chivalry coincides with
the obsolescence of the knight, serving as an ideological mask for
his decreased social status in an increasingly mercantile and capitalist world. Taken up in turn by the rising merchant class, adventure
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similarly justified and masked the political role of the capitalist
through the glorification of financial risk and adventure. And since
profit negates the very risks undertaken in capitalist travel, it is only
in promoting an ideology of risk that narratives of adventure, like
the discourse of speculator, investor, and merchant, justify their
profitable returns. Heroic adventure, in Nerlich’s analysis, is thus the
mere alibi of this closed economy, whose aim, in fact, is “to remove
adventure as far as possible from any incalculable risk.”63 Nerlich’s
historical approach allows us to see how the decline of adventure
in modern literature may be a symptom of the breakdown of bourgeois confidence in its historical mission. This doubt dominates in
the literature of the nineteenth century, though the ideology of
adventure persisted in popular media, just as it does today in the
touristic discourse of so-called “adventure travel.”64
Claude Simon’s great war novel The Flanders Road provides a late
instance of the demise of chivalry and adventure. Interestingly, in so
doing the novel also contrasts the two cultural traditions of Spain
and France. Horsemanship, horseracing, and the French cavalry
are dominant themes in Simon’s novel, whose story weaves back
and forth between the history of an aristocratic officer, routed in
the Napoleonic war with Spain, and the experience of the narrator, a soldier in the French cavalry in World War II. The retreat
from Spain, remembered in the context of World War II, allows
Simon to embroider a vast historical tapestry, from the origins of
French literature in La Chanson de Roland up to the recent past.
The narrative comprises a series of shifting and repeated tableaus
that are strikingly static; the text insists on the immobility of all
the soldiers’ actions, as in the description of “the four riders and
the five horses somnambulistic and not advancing but lifting and
setting down their hooves almost motionless on the road.”65 The
book’s emblematic image is that of a dead horse lying in the mud,
repeatedly invoked as frozen in motion or petrified like a fossil:
“it seemed to have been there forever, like one of those fossilized
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animals or plants that had returned to the mineral kingdom, with
its two front feet bent into a foetal posture of prayer” (26). This
static and frozen figure connects the narrator’s obsessive memories,
though it cannot be located in a determinate time in the narrative.
Indeed, the dead horse seems to fall outside of time in a kind of
infinite acceleration, “as if the margin of time normally necessary
for the passage from one kingdom to the other (from the animal to
the mineral) had this time been crossed at once” (104). It remains
for us to determine how and why such a paralyzed image coincides
with a sudden passage and crossing.
The originality of Simon’s novel lies in its insistence on a time
that is not so much historical as geological. Indeed, all seems petrified or frozen in the novel, caught in the imperceptible movement of a glacier, “that Olympian and cold progression, that slow
glacier moving since the beginning of time” (Flanders Road, 284).
Time, conceived as a glacial substance containing all the novel’s
characters and events, suspends chronology and causality to offer
instead a web of episodes linked not in a single temporal chain
but rather as static elements in a contemporaneous frozen space.
This bold narrative gambit of an impersonal glacial and geological
time nonetheless betrays recognizably psychological obsessions and
conventional narrative structures: “I the horseman the booted conqueror coming from the depths of time coming to seduce to carry
off the lily-white princess” (272). This seduction, moreover, bears
the traits of a Freudian family romance; the mother of Georges,
the protagonist, hails from an aristocratic lineage, and Georges,
in seducing the wife of his aristocratic officer, seems to flirt with
incest and defy his father’s peasant lineage. Georges’s paralyses can
then be ascribed to a neurotic fixation that sustains both his desire
and its prohibition in images of frozen motion. This ambivalence
also marks the novel’s relationship to the adventurous narratives it
aims to challenge and dismantle. In this respect, then, Georges—
and Simon himself—would be similar to Georges’s mother, who is
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“animated by contradictory sentiments, probably uncertain herself
if in narrating these scandalous, or ridiculous, or ignominious, or
Cornelian stories she wanted to deprecate that nobility, that title
she had not inherited, or on the contrary give it more luster, so as
to further gorge her pride with the consanguinity and the glamour
reflected from it” (58). The reference to Corneille, appropriately
enough, refers us to that classic tale of Spanish chivalry, El Cid.
But in taking leave of such literary history, Simon’s novel betrays
an anxiety of influence that paralyzes his narrative. This ambivalent
tension reaches a climax in the elaborate scenes of lovemaking at
the end of the novel. The woman’s body is identified with all that
is earthly, mineral, and geological; a misogynist fantasy thus lays
the blame for corruption and death in the fatal desire “to return to
the moist and secret hiding place, the dark mouth” of his lover’s sex
(296). We have seen how the frozen image of the dead horse also
invokes a sudden “passage” into another realm. Petrified and timeless, and yet suddenly crossing over a limit, the dead horse shares
with Georges a similar paralyzed motion in the act of lovemaking,
as he indulges in fantasies of guilty transgression. Women and the
earth are insistently compared in such figures as “the matrix of pale
ochre earth” (161), and the “ancient matrix” (221). Thus, Georges is
described as “paralyzed with cramps, and as motionless as the dead
nag, his face buried in the thick grass, the hairy earth, his whole
body flattened as if he were trying to vanish between the lips of
the ditch, to melt, to slip, to sink altogether through the narrow
crevice to rejoin the original matter (matrix)” (249). Here, sex and
desire seem to give way to Freud’s death drive. I will return, in what
follows, to this key notion in Freudian theory. Here let me briefly
indicate that Simon’s approach to the death drive resembles Freud’s
in its speculative delirium, as well as in its attempt to encompass a
negativity that reaches beyond narrative and structure. But if the
death drive opens onto sheer negativity and the loss of meaning, a
compensatory move usually allays the costs; in Simon’s novel, that
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move would be a grounding of meaning in a mythic feminizing of
the work of destruction: “[B]ut what could you call that: not war not
the classical destruction or extermination of one of the two armies
but rather the disappearance the absorption by the primal nothingness or the primal All of what a week before were still regiments
batteries squadrons of men, or better still: the disappearance of the
very notion of a regiment a battery a squadron of men, or better still:
the disappearance of any notion of any concept at all” (305).
What transports remain when the main thrust of narrative is
seemingly abandoned, as we see here? What subjects replace the
hero, adventurer, and conqueror? In Simon’s case, the avant-gardism
of his prose subtly perpetuates chivalry in the very dismantling of
its literary codes; in this sense it is akin to all adventure tales that,
as Nerlich argues, are inherently belated and anachronistic. I have
argued, further, that a Freudian account of the text serves as a key
to the narrator’s paralyses. In what follows, I will further develop
the stakes of a Freudian critique to show how modern literature’s
discourse of adventure is inflected away from the conventional
domain of adventurous plot and action and toward psychic risk,
rebellion, and transgression.
In an account of the demise of adventure in Western literature,
Paul Zweig’s The Adventurer argues for a rehabilitation of the adventurous hero, understood as an indispensable figure who dramatizes
the defining boundaries of the social order through transgression
and risk. Zweig’s modern exemplar of such a hero is Nietszche,
whose transgressive philosophy rejects the bad conscience of the
criminal in favor of the overman. Zweig’s celebration of adventure
in literature fails to account, though, for what remains normative
in such tales of masculine risk, discovery, and monstrosity. Interestingly, Zweig’s first invocation of risk goes by way of paralysis:
“Haven’t all of us, now and then, experienced moments of abrupt
intensity, when our lives seemed paralyzed by risk?”66 This paralysis
may well evoke the moment of suspense before action; it also points,
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however, to a breakdown of transport, a hesitation at the place
of transgression. I would suggest that such paralyzed transgression can be approached through psychoanalysis, which offers some
of the richest accounts of the paradoxes of transport. In contrast
to Zweig’s hero, the psychoanalytic subject would be that other
criminal whose desire, in its byways and displacements, confronts
the motivating and paralyzing force of prohibition. Neurotic travel
reveals the structuring role of an internalized prohibition that the
subject vainly attempts to circumvent. As the subject’s alibi, travel,
then, may be the scene of a failed reflexive turn; within the modern
adventurer lies the ironic figure of a Rat Man, whose obsessions,
fixations, and frenetic wanderings are so many frustrated attempts
to bring to light his compromised desiring motives.67 The reflexive
turn away from adventure and toward the everyday is a hallmark
of modernism and the Nouveau Roman; in Sarraute’s early work,
the emotional transports of her characters are reduced to minimal
“tropisms” in a stifling atmosphere of anxiety and claustrophobia.68 In its characteristic reflexivity, modern literature shares with
psychoanalysis a suspicion of travel, or what Paul Morand calls the
“délit de fuite” (“hit and run”; literally “crime of flight”), and the
breakdown of heroic narrative confirms literature’s quest for other
transports, at the cost of paralysis.69
From conquistadors and chivalry to the modern cavalry, it is a
small step to the corrida, belated holdover of an ideal of masculine
heroism. Here again we find a paralyzed transgression, such as stands
at the beginning of Michel Leiris’s autobiographical project. Despite
its promising title, Leiris’s Manhood (L’Age d’homme) is no account of
heroism, except in suggesting an impossible ideal: that of the matador
to which the author aspires in his poetics of risk. As stated in the
essay that opens the autobiography, Leiris aims at exposing himself
to a “danger” analogous to that of the bull’s horn by submitting
himself to an absolutely truthful self-portrait.70 Leiris notes that his
writing is intended as an “act” of confession inspired by the experi-
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ence of a prior psychoanalytic treatment. This act, however, tends
irresistibly toward paralysis, since the “sculptural” model to which
Leiris aspires is that of a matador whose “feet remain motionless,”
controlling the passing bull with his cape (161). Further, Leiris says
that he wants his autobiography to present him as a “solid block” in
protection against death—adding that, paradoxically enough, this
contradicts his own intention to “risk everything” (162). This crucial
equivocation between self-constitution and absolute risk, unresolved
by Leiris, points to a crisis of identity at the site of transgression, a
crisis marked by castration anxiety, tellingly evoked by the threatening
horn of the bull. Dedicated to his friend Georges Bataille, Leiris’s
Manhood bears the stamp of his friend’s Nietzschian philosophy of
transgression, and thus seems to confirm Zweig’s argument; and
yet, Leiris’s examples of the corrida and sacred ritual fall more fully
within the scope of a psychoanalytic predicament. Here, transgression conveys nothing so much as the compromised status of neurotic
desire, both sustained and inhibited by a reigning prohibition. Thus,
the matador, as embodiment of a ritualized transgression, is seen as
submitting to a rule of conduct with respect to the dangerous bull.
There is “an immediate connection between obedience to the rule
and the danger incurred,” Leiris notes (160). Indeed, the rule, “far
from being a protection, contributes to his danger.” The rule, then,
submits to another imperative, that of the symbolic law conveyed
by the phallic horn. Leiris’s paralysis in the face of this threatening
law is the price of his wayward, transgressive desire.
Another way of approaching the paralytic aspect of Leiris’s work
would be by means of the register of identification and desire that
Jacques Lacan terms the Imaginary. As the primary mode of the
subject’s identification, the Imaginary initially serves to stabilize
the infant as a specular ego in resistance to its bodily disorganization. Lacan emphasizes the inertia, fixation, and resistance that
characterize the specular ego in its “formal stagnation,” a stasis
akin to the face of an actor in a film that has been stopped.71 In the
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adult subject the persistence of the Imaginary represents above all
a vain effort of self-constitution in resistance to the symbolic law
of castration. Leiris’s frustrated writings and travels would thus
be structured and limited within the scope of an impossible and
illusory effort of self-realization. It is worth recalling that Lacan
defines egoical identity as an aspect of the subject that is intractable
and permanent. While defined by a moment of development Lacan
isolates as a “stage,” the mirror stage is not one that is overcome,
but is incorporated within the subject and in Lacan’s discourse in
an increasingly complex structuring network, overlapping and interfering with the Symbolic and the Real. At the same time, if this
Imaginary regime that “fixates” the subject is irreducible, it contains
within its own dynamic the seeds of its own dismantling. This is
the topic of Lacan’s essay “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” where
he highlights the frustrating nature of the ego and the characteristic
violence it fosters. Like Freud, Lacan considers aggression against
others to be determined by an original aggressivity toward oneself.
Lacan refines this point by tying its logic to “a primary identification that structures the subject as a rival with himself.”72 Accordingly, aggressivity, in Lacan’s analysis, is fundamentally aggressivity
turned against the specular ego; the ego, in its frustrations, is seen
as undertaking the destruction of its own claims to integrity—
such as Leiris’s “single solid block”—and ultimately aiming beyond
the Imaginary. In this account, then, Freud’s primary narcissism
is directed less at defense and self-constitution than toward the
very overcoming of its illusions. Lacan thus parts company with
Freudian ego psychology, which makes the ego the very core of
the well-adjusted individual. In contrast, Lacan states that egoical
frustration and aggression point the way to the emergence of the
subject in the place of the ego. This self-realization is undertaken by
means of the death drive, whose tireless work compels the subject
to dismantle its cherished illusions. Leiris’s “autocritique” can be
usefully situated within this problematic, and the symptoms of
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Leiris’s masochism may be located at this primordial level, where
the work of self-reflection and autobiography is directed at the demolition of the image of selfhood. Accordingly, a crucial feature
of Leiris’s travel accounts is their self-deflating presentation of his
imaginary desires and motives. I examine Leiris’s work and travels
in chapter 1, where I compare him with two precursors, Nerval
and Gautier, and more at length in chapter 4, where I examine his
ethnographic travels.
Psychoanalysis thus provides a means to reconsider the topos
of imaginary travel, usefully recast as a phantasmatic domain of
vexed identification, rivalry, and frustrated transports. In his Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization, Octave Mannoni
addressed the imaginary motives for traveling to underdeveloped
countries: “Baudelaire felt, as we all do, that savage countries and
savage peoples were the nearest imitation he could find in the real
world of that of his childhood—of paradise. We may go further and
say, with but slight exaggeration, that there would be no ethnographers, explorers, or colonials ‘among the savages’ if it were not
for this vocation.” Mannoni links this vocation to a fundamental
ambivalence that plays out in the colonial drama: “civilised man is
painfully divided between the desire to ‘correct’ the ‘errors’ of the
savages and the desire to identify himself with them in his search for
some lost paradise.”73 What accounts for this ambivalence, and how
does it serve to motivate the traveler? Mannoni’s formulations here
provide the elements of a Lacanian analysis. The traveler’s picture of
the native would be framed in the Imaginary, that register of desire
in which the subject projects the illusory figments of an impossible
plenitude by means of mirroring relationships with images of the
self and others. This specular resolution is purchased at a great cost
to the subject, however, as the ironic consequence of the subject’s
imaginary strivings for identity is to see itself only as an other. The
ego is thus constituted as a relationship to a field of projections that
the self cannot fully assume; for this reason, Lacan says, the ego is
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“frustration in its essence.” All imaginary relations are as a result
structured by an unresolvable dynamic of identification and rivalry
as the subject struggles with the terms of his specular alienation.
Mannoni points to such a dynamic when he asserts that the traveler is painfully divided by the desire to “identify” with the primitive and to impose himself on him. The alter ego is always prey to
such violent alteration by the egoic subject due to the aggressivity
inherent to his specular frustration.74 With its focus on the case of
French Madagascar, Mannoni’s Prospero and Caliban provides me
with some of the terms with which I approach the work of Jean
Paulhan in chapter 3. In close readings of Paulhan’s work, including
his linguistic study of Malagasy proverbs, I underscore characteristic
turns and reversals that bear persistently on a dynamic of mastery
and submission. Paulhan’s linguistic studies in Madagascar thus
symptomatically enact a problematic of subjection, in which questions
of agency and authority vie with intractable doubts and anxiety.
These vexing figures of uncertain agency defy accountability, and
as a result, Paulhan’s cultural estrangement and dislocation yields
no clear narrative but only paralyses and paradoxical transports.
Insofar as the traveler follows the vectors of an imaginary desire, his
travels will be marked, then, by a defining frustration. Psychoanalysis
thus provides useful terms for a political critique of imaginary travel.
One might, for instance, recast Dean MacCannell’s well-known
sociological study of tourism in Lacanian terms. If, as MacCannell puts it, the tourist’s journey is “a search for authenticity,” his
travel is, however, fundamentally nostalgic and illusory, sustained
by figments of stereotyped elsewheres and others.75 Frustration
habitually accompanies the quest for authenticity, which misrecognizes its true purpose, Jonathan Culler points out, as “a quest for
an experience of signs.”76 The habitual resentment by the tourist
of other tourists could be attributed to specular rivalry, and the
friction between the tourist’s cherished illusions and the awkward
mediation of his experience could be cast as a struggle between the
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Imaginary and the Symbolic. Moreover, imaginary travel allows us
to see how touristic travel can survive, and even sustain itself, in its
very nostalgia and belatedness; the traveler’s disenchantment—and
even his failure—can console him in his illusions. We have seen
how “imperialist nostalgia” stakes its claim to lost authenticity in a
loss it perpetuates and dissimulates. Similarly, imaginary travel lays
hold of images and stereotypes whose frustrating nature fosters an
evermore imperious fixation. This is captured in Malek Alloula’s
catalogue of colonial Algerian postcards.77 The postcards document
the power of the stereotype in authorizing French claims for colonial domination, exposing in a striking way the role of the sexual
phantasm in the discursive hegemony of colonial rule. A victory
of the gaze, such postcards disavow their own frustrated access to
women who remained in large part out of reach and sight of the
French colonial.78 In chapter 2, I explore this ambiguous colonial
fascination in Fromentin’s rapturous description of an Algerian
harem, and argue that Fromentin’s Algerian journeys demonstrate
the belated traveler’s jealous hold on colonial illusions.
Psychoanalysis also presents novel insights into one of the most
time-honored examples of paralyzed travel: Zeno’s arguments on
the impossibility of movement. Several recent Lacanian essays have
turned their attention to Zeno’s paradoxes, the best known of which
represents Achilles in pursuit of a tortoise. Zeno’s argument purports
to demonstrate that although Achilles is faster than the tortoise he
will be forever unable to catch up to it. Since the tortoise has an
advance on him, the argument goes, Achilles must make up first the
distance between them, plus the advance. This advance, however
short, becomes infinite in Zeno’s argument, for once a given distance
is covered, an advance always remains, which itself becomes a distance to cover, and so on. The prey thus infinitely recedes in smaller
and smaller increments. Slavoj Zižek points out that psychoanalysis
allows us to recognize in this seeming sophistry what is in fact the
most common of experiences, namely the dream of running in
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place.79 Zeno’s paradox thus holds true at an unconscious level of
experience. What the tortoise would represent, in this analysis, is the
subject’s goal: not any particular object but the object as such, whose
promise of infinite satisfaction provokes its infinite regress. Zižek’s
argument concerning Zeno draws on the Lacanian notion of the
objet petit a. In an important scene from Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, the child conjures up an object that would cover over the
absence provoked by the mother’s departure. Lacan’s reading of
Freud asserts that the absence bears less on the mother herself than
on the child’s identity; out of the child’s sense of lack he precipitates
an object—the ego—with which his integrity can be assumed. This
object Lacan terms the objet petit a, an object that the child attempts
to recover but which, paradoxically, was not there to begin with.
This object is inversely figured in the mirror stage, where the child
anticipates an identity in the form of an image that his body cannot
yet correspond to. The imaginary object thus exists within a temporality that cannot coincide with the subject: on the one hand, an
impossible nostalgia posits retroactively what must have been; on the
other, a dream of fulfillment to come conjures up a future perfect,
what will have been. As cause of desire, the imaginary object propels
the subject in a quest for what cannot be attained.
A second paradox of Zeno’s posits that an arrow in flight is motionless. Since at any point in its trajectory it must occupy a certain space,
it is claimed to be perpetually at rest. The logic of both paradoxes
relies on the principle of cutting up motion into increments. Joan
Copjec ties this logic to the rationale that leads Aristotle, in his theses
on movement, to posit the Prime Mover, an immobile agent at the
heart of any motion. What dictates that the identity of the arrow
or the substance of a given being must interrupt its own motion?
In Copjec’s analysis, it is the primal cut between the Imaginary
and the Symbolic that accompanies the subject’s every move and
threatens him with paralysis even as it causes his very flight. “The
subject constructed by language finds itself detached from a part
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of itself. And it is this primary detachment that renders fruitless all
the subject’s efforts for a reunion with its complete being. The arc
of its strivings appears to the subject as Zeno’s arrow—an endlessly
interrupted flight that can only asymptotically approach its goal.”80
Lacan adds to Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise the clarification that the subject (Achilles) may well be able to overtake the
object (the tortoise), he simply cannot attain it. The most obscure
moment of the paradox thus becomes that of the limit point where
the subject crosses over or crosses out the place of the object: a point
of coincidence without contact, a point of presence without present.
“Clearly,” Lacan says, “Achilles can only overtake the tortoise, he
cannot catch up with her. He rejoins her only in infinity.”81 Copjec
ties this question of infinite regression to the problematic of the
signifier. In a linguistic order founded on difference, the infinite
deferral of meaning, how, she asks, can the sign ever reach a point
where meaning can coincide with the sign? Copjec suggests that
the limit that suspends these alternatives is the subject’s finitude,
the incompletion that precipitates the subject’s impossible object of
desire. This finitude motivates the subject; the cause of his actions
originates in an impasse whose overcoming is the impossible object.
In Milner’s words, Zeno shows that “the impossible is necessary.”82
The solution to the paradox lies with the limit: it is because the
subject is finite or castrated that the limit is overcome, not once and
for all but endlessly. Copjec says, “The psychoanalytical subject is
not infinite, it is finite, and it is this limit that causes the infinity,
or unsatisfiability, of its desire. One thing comes to be substituted
for another in an endless chain only because the subject is cut off
from that essential thing that would complete it.”83 A recognition
of this unsatisfiability would be, then, the condition for an ethics
of traveling desire. Ethical transports, renouncing the imperious
image and its objects, would be modeled on the Freudian drive, a
sheer impulse without object but its own tireless quest.
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As Copjec’s essay makes clear, her Lacanian analysis of the paradoxes of transport aims to rebut a deconstructive theory of linguistic
difference. Derrida’s critique of Lacan involves a challenge to the
theory of the Symbolic as structuring linguistic order, with castration
and transgression as its linchpins. Even among Lacan’s dissenters,
including many of his feminist critics, castration, transgression,
and the law provide orienting terms for a questioning of symbolic
norms and their social instantiations. Derrida’s deconstruction of
Freud and Lacan disorients these terms in a radical way. There is, as
a result, a hint of anxiety in Copjec’s invocation of an unstructured
infinity, whose limiting cut, for all its painful consequences, offers
a structuring reassurance. Indeed, her very argument with Derrida
betrays a structuring reflex of opposition, one that, moreover, pits
infinity against its contrary. However, Derrida’s analysis of the limit
does not itself posit the infinite Copjec would attribute to him.
Neither finitude nor infinity, Derrida’s limit poses the problem of
an aporia more paralyzing than Lacanian theory, and more paradoxical even than Zeno.
Among Derrida’s most searching inquiries into the figures of
transport is his essay on Freud’s death drive, where he suggests
the name paralyse for the critique he undertakes.84 Freud’s metapsychological Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with its focus on death,
finitude, and the “beyond,” allows Derrida to question the role of
the limit in Freudian thought. This limit is Freud’s very topic—the
limit of life—but as Derrida shows, it is also the limit of Freud’s
own discourse as it comes up against its unthought margins and
boundaries. Derrida thus displaces the question as Freud poses it,
to show how the text’s unworking of its argument stages its own
death-work at the limits of knowledge. Derrida emphasizes the
erratic, stumbling, and wayward progress of Freud’s argument,
his démarche, underscoring how Freud’s textual tarrying with the
limit entails a fruitful paralysis. Metaphysical and spiritual figure
par excellence, the notion of the “beyond” is significantly critiqued
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in Freud’s own analysis, but it is only his inadvertent stumblings
and paralyses that constitute a deconstruction of that notion. The
value of Freud’s inquiry lies, therefore, not so much in his theory of
a purported biological death drive as in its enacting of a “destruction
drive,” the persistent undoing of the text’s own argument.
Derrida thus finds Freud an ally in the deconstruction of death
as theme or dialectical negation. Death as the radically other, Derrida argues, cannot be appropriated or set to work by the dialectic;
its otherness is not opposed to life or the pleasure principle, nor is
it sublated in a movement that transcends that opposition. Similarly, in an essay on Blanchot, Derrida reduces the movement at
the limit to the mere step or “trace” of a “pas”: a step beyond that
is simultaneously the negation of that same step. The grand pathos
of Bataille’s theory of sacrifice and the grim negativity of Blanchot
amount as a result to a mere pun. Derrida is careful to caution,
however, that such a pun risks being mistaken as mere voluntary
play or, as in Freud, a successful, if momentary, transgression of the
censoring law.85 The duplicity of the “pas” (step/not) aims instead to
convey, in a pairing of nonopposed contraries, the differential stroke
that inscribes otherness within any given sign. Likewise, Derrida’s
witty and punning intervention into Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure
Principle aims not to make light of the death drive, but to bring
out, in Freud’s own inquiry, what resists death’s appropriation as
theme or telos. Death is not dialectical otherness and negation; it is,
instead, a paralyzing confrontation with a minimal limit that, always
already crossed, binds the sign to its duplicitous other. Derrida’s
“pas” conveys this play of otherness and iteration that confounds
any account of presence, paralyzing both writer and reader in their
encounter with its paradoxical trace.
In Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks has named the theory of the
death drive as “Freud’s masterplot.”86 It is noteworthy that in using
Freud’s text for his narratological purposes, Brooks’s focus is on
nineteenth-century literature, and not on more-modern fictions—
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such as Claude Simon’s, for instance—that dismantle and problematize the arc of conventional narrative. Moreover, Freud’s Beyond the
Pleasure Principle is not so much a plot as a tangle of fits and starts,
of retractions and reversals. Reading for the plod, so to speak, we
bring out paralyses in Freud more akin to the texts surveyed here:
the trudging fictions of Beckett, the wayward self-scrutiny of Leiris,
the drifting of Barthes. To catch the drift of Barthes’s texts is to read
desire in its paradoxical transports, in tropisms and paralyses that
belie narrative order. As I show in chapter 5, Barthes’s early Mythologies took to task the political, ideological, and colonial economies of
travel and tourism as expressed in the popular media of the France
of the 1950s. Subsequently, Barthes theorizes other transports that
go by the names of dérive and atopie. Such transports reflect a turn
in Barthes’s work, begun with s/z, toward the theorization of sexuality, pleasure, and desire. s/z also marks Barthes’s departure from
the structuralist paradigm, and his espousal of paradoxical transports carries him away from structural models of sexual identity,
plot, and narrative. This proves a significant means of challenging
gender norms as embedded in traditional narrative and plot, and
as perpetuated in narrative theory.87 One of Barthes’s tactics in the
face of such normative sexual roles is to redistribute them along the
lines of gender. Thus, pointing to the convention that “Woman is
sedentary, Man hunts, journeys,” Barthes claims the privilege of
the former: “sedentary, motionless, at hand, in expectation, nailed
to the spot, in suspense [en souffrance].”88 This paralysis defines the
principal role of the lover in A Lover’s Discourse as one who suffers
the absence of the other: “in any man who utters the other’s absence
something feminine is declared: this man who waits and who suffers
from his waiting is miraculously feminized. A man is not feminized
because he is inverted but because he is in love” (14). Barthes’s
appropriation of a conventional topos of amorous narrative thus
yields a queer alternative to its sexual essentialism and elaborates
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an ethics of desire that refuses the spoils of romantic adventure and
chivalrous conquest.
Barthes’s suspicion of travel in A Lover’s Discourse entails a rejection of narrative, to the extent that the latter is wed to motives that
would deny or attenuate the force of a desire aiming beyond ends,
needs, and morals. Paralysis and fragmentation, as opposed to the
language of mastery and adventure, nonetheless allow for other
forms of transport. The language of absence provides for a space
of play, a rhythm of attachment and separation. A frequent model
of such transports for Barthes is the fort-da game from Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, by which the child mimes the comings and goings of his mother. Barthes is close to Lacan in taking this scene
as exemplifying the force of the drive in its impossible relation to a
forever absent object. Indeed, Barthes specifically adopts the term
dérive (drift) from Lacan to name the paradoxical transports of desire.
Unlike Lacan, however, Barthes holds to dérive and its relation to the
maternal object in resistance to the Symbolic as such. Barthes thus
departs from the psychoanalytic critics we have surveyed so far, and
attempts to reclaim the Imaginary as an alternative to the normative constraints of social and sexual identification. This alternative
ultimately entails a rehabilitation of imaginary travel as an ethical
relation in which the subject makes room for his atopic desire as the
space of his necessary illusions and queer transports.
Barthes launches the challenge of such atopic transports in s/z:
“What would be the narrative of a journey,” Barthes asks, “in which
it was said that one stays somewhere without having arrived, that
one travels without having departed—in which it was never said
that, having departed, one arrives or fails to arrive?”89 Barthes’s
impossible journey and its paradoxical transports resonate with
all those explored in this book. As we will see in the next chapter,
such an impossible journey is highly evocative of the spatiotemporal complexities of the immigrant experience. It also speaks to
the nightmare of marginality and discrimination as described by
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Boudjedra, the focus of my final chapter. Barthes’s analysis thus
not only can inform atopic pleasures and drifts but also contribute
to a political critique of the exclusion of sans-papiers and migrants
from the dominant narratives of travel. Such insights are enabled
in part by cultural and political criticism, as seen in Mythologies, but
also, more significantly, by the paralyzed reading in s/z, a patient,
exhaustive, “slow motion” and “step-by-step” approach (12). Neither
arriving nor failing to arrive, as Barthes has it, the transports of such
reading are a pleasurable dérive. At stake in this drift, once again, is
the figure of an aporetic boundary, a rive—“shore” or “bank”—that
defies access. Barthes’s paradoxical drift thus accords with Derrida’s
in “Pas”: “What arrives would always arrive at the border. Affecting
the border. But by remaining there: by not arriving.” 90 Neither
movement nor stasis, the “non-arrivé” is an impossible arrival at
each and every step.91 At the same time, however, the “non-arrival”
is promising, as it suggests not only paralysis but also transports,
translations, and destinations still to come. For the rive or border
is also a crossroads; here at this crossroads we will meet the arrivant,
the twin and reversible figure of the colonist and immigrant, each
paralyzed by the legacy of modern French travel.
At the end of Sentimental Education, Flaubert gives a summary
indictment of bourgeois travel: “He travelled. . . . He returned.”92
One hundred years later, Barthes’s s/z offers a similarly telegraphic
synopsis: “To depart/to travel/to arrive/to stay: the journey is saturated” (105). Between the two and stretching beyond into a wider
nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernity, French literary culture expresses a pervasive mistrust of travel. One might call this a
dominant literary discourse against travel, akin to the modern French
denigration of vision studied by Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes. Unlike Jay’s, however, my own approach aims not at a comprehensive
cultural history, and does not claim to fully represent even a literary
history of the period. In this respect, I share Jay’s own qualifications
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regarding the limitations of “discourse” as an organizing principle
of cultural historiography. Jay quotes from James Clifford on this
point: “Discourse analysis is always in a sense, unfair to authors.
It is interested not in what they have to say or feel as subjects, but is
concerned merely with statements as related to other statements in
a field.” 93 A similar problem arises when treating travel as unitary
theme or motif; Clifford’s work, eminently sensitive to travel’s complexities, has pursued the seemingly contradictory, but more precisely
oxymoronic and paralyzing implications of “traveling cultures” and
“dwelling-in-travel.”94 Likewise, to avoid the risk of overgeneralizing
claims and illusory themes, in what follows I pursue close readings
of the work of a select number of authors; a sustained focus on their
texts brings out the particular lineaments of their paralyses within
a discursive context they evoke, contest, and alter. It is, in fact, only
from a synoptic perspective—such as that of Flaubert and Barthes
above—or by means of selective quotes and broad themes, that one
could make the claim for a simple, consistent, or uniform modern
French negation of travel. A closer, slower approach reveals that
paralyses are always challenges not to travel as such but to the norms
and constraints of travel and translation. In this sense, the critique
of travel is a “counter-discourse,” as Richard Terdiman defines it;
not simply the discourse of antagonism and resistance, but a more
imbricated contestation within the dominant order.95 Paralyses, as
distinct from critique, would occupy the very site of this imbrication:
between discourse and counterdiscourse; between the colonizer’s
vision and the recognition of the other; between touristic mentality
and the experience of alterity. Given the omnipresence of figures of
transport in language, the vexations of paralyzed speech threaten
all the terms by which we represent our motions, emotions, motives, and meanings. As a result, language too becomes the site of
contestation, its powerfully freighted metaphors paralyzed by poetic
insight into more problematic turns of speech. Even at their most
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stymied, however, paralyzed travels always speak to new mobilities,
and it is to a more detailed study of such paradoxical transports that
we will turn next.
Having opened this introduction with a discussion of Beckett’s
paralyzed travels, I will index in closing a late manuscript of his titled
“The Way.” Beckett accompanied his drafts of this brief, unfinished,
and unpublished text with the image of a figure eight, alternately
drawn upright and horizontal. Each image figures a “winding oneway way,” the path of a perpetual circuit. “The one way back was
on and on was always back.”96 The cover of this book is indebted to
Beckett’s simple and evocative image that conveys a journey both
infinite and infinitely stymied. Beckett’s “Way” may serve as a map
to the chapters that follow.
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